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THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS OF THE 
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
Gustave M. Hauser* 
IN recent years the Comptroller General of the United States has repeatedly, and often bitterly, complained to the Congress of 
refusals by government officials to make available to his representa-
tives such information as he may from time to time request in 
connection with his efforts to uncover, by means of investigation, 
wasteful, extravagant or inefficient practices in the executive 
branch of the federal government.1 
It is the contention of the Comptroller General that Congress 
has provided him ·with a broad authority to compel the executive 
departments and agencies to produce for his scrutiny such informa-
tion and such books, documents or records regarding their powers, 
duties, activities, organization, financial transactions and methods 
of business as he may in his discretion from time to time require 
of them.2 The full exercise of this plenitude of power is, accord-
ing to the Comptroller General, a precondition of the proper dis-
charge of his "statutory responsibility."3 
Executive branch refusals to produce the requested informa-
tion have with near uniformity been based upon the disputed con-
stitutional privilege of the executive branch to withhold certain 
information from the Congress.4 Lengthy, often heated, and al-
ways inconclusive debates concerning the existence, the nature 
and the scope of this executive branch privilege continue to rage 
on Capitol Hill, and the doctrine has been the object of consid-
erable scholarly comment.15 Insofar as they have concerned the 
• Legal Adviser and Assistant Secretary, General Telephone & Electronics Intema• 
tional, Incorporated. - Ed. 
l A summary of recent instances in which the withholding of information by execu-
tive departments and agencies has been reported by the Comptroller General to the 
Congress is contained in Refusals to the General Accounting Office of Access to Records 
of the Executive Departments and Agencies, S. Doc. No. 108, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). 
2 Memoranda submitted by the General Accounting Office in Availability of Informa-
l
( tion from Federal Departments and Agencies, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Gov• 
1 
ernment Operations of the House of Representatives, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. Exhibit IV-A, 
i at 3753-54 (1958). 
8 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CoMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES (hereinafter 
CoMP. GEN. ANN. REP.] H.R. Doc. No. 14, 86th Cong .• 1st Sess. 6 (1958). 
-i See, e.g., supra note I. 
IS There is no Supreme Court decision dealing with the privilege of the President to 
refuse information to the Congress. The most thorough study of the doctrine of executive 
branch privilege is to be found in Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional Committees for 
Executive Papers, IO Fm. B.J. 103-50, 223-59, 319-50 (1949). As to the congressional 
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ability of the executive branch to withhold information from the 
Comptroller General, these debates have been premised on the 
assumption that the Comptroller General acts for and exercises the 
powers of Congress, that his authority to request information is 
equal to that of Congress, and that when he attempts to exercise 
greater authority the executive branch may ignore his requests as 
unconstitutional. 
Little attention has been paid the proposition that the inves-
tigatory powers of the Comptroller General are derived from spe-
cific statutes and that such statutory powers may in fact be less 
than those enjoyed by Congress itself. This article examines the 
statutory responsibility and authority of the Comptroller General 
to investigate executive action for the purpose of determining 
whether the legitimacy of his requests for information may be 
challenged by the executive branch on statutory as well as on con-
stitutional grounds. 
I. DUTIES AND STATUS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL6 
The office of the Comptroller General and the General Ac-
counting Office which he heads were created in 192F to stand 
watch on behalf of Congress over the process of financial adminis-
tration in the national government from the time an appropriation 
is passed until all expenditure accounts have been settled. The 
broad function of the Comptroller General is to audit and settle 
the public accounts and to advise and assist the Congress in matters 
relating to public monies.8 The activities of the General Ac-
counting Office may be analytically divided into two major 
categories: control and audit. 
power of investigation generally, see Congressional Power of Investigation, S. Doc. No. 99, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); THE RIGHT OF CoNGRESS To OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM THE 
EXECUTIVE AND FROM OTHER AGENCIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(H.R. Comm. Print 1956). 
6 "Representative Fairfield: •.. [W]hat are the specific functions of the Comptroller 
General? 
"Representative Clark: To tell the gentleman the truth, nobody knows.'' 58 CoNG. 
REc. 7277 (1919). This exchange, which took place on the floor of the House of Repre• 
sentatives at the time of the debates on the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 [42 Stat. 
20 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § I (1958)], helps to explain the numerous disagreements, past and 
present, as to the status and powers of this exceptional office in the federal government. 
7 A proposal to establish budget and accounting offices was considered and passed by 
the 66th Congress, 59 CONG. REc. 8609 (1920), but it was vetoed by President Wilson. It 
was similar in all but minor respects to the bill in the 67th Congress which was passed 
and became the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. 
s The General Accounting Office, A Study of Its Functions and Operations, H.R. REP. 
No. 1441, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949). 
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To carry out what is unofficially referred to as his control 
function, the Comptroller General is, first, responsible for the 
installation and supervision of an efficient and uniform accounting 
system.9 Second, the Comptroller General settles all money claims 
and demands against the government.10 He superintends the 
recovery of all debts due the United States.11 Finally, the Comp-
troller General is required to settle and adjust the accounts of 
public officers.12 This control function is one distinct from that 
of audit, which is the procedure normally accompanying settle-
ment and adjustment by which the Comptroller General checks 
on both the mathematics and legality of any single transaction. 
Any questions of fact or law raised by audit are resolved on final 
settlement or adjustment of the account. The Comptroller Gen-
eral, by refusing a claim or rejecting the settlement of an account, 
determines what is an unlawful use of public funds. The exercise 
by the General Accounting Office of its authority in the field of 
claims and accounts frequently involves the issuance by its Gen-
eral Counsel of legal opinions directly interpreting appropriations 
and indirectly interpreting and applying all federal, state, and 
even foreign law.13 
The audit function of the Comptroller General is not neces-
sarily limited to the scope of a normal commercial audit.14 It is 
not confined to a mere review of addition and the fairness of a 
statement of accounts. Because the Comptroller General was 
given the power to settle and adjust accounts, an additional pur-
pose of his audit is the determination of the propriety, from a legal 
standpoint, of the expenditures he scrutinizes. Moreover, the 
Comptroller General may implement by means of audit his special 
responsibility to inquire on behalf of Congress into waste, ex-
travagance and inefficiency_ in the expenditure of public funds.15 
9 42 Stat. 25 (1921), 64 Stat. 835 (1950), 31 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50, 66 (1958). 
10 42 Stat. 24 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1958). 
1142 Stat. 24 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 93 (1958). 
12 See generally 31 U.S.C. ch. 2 (1958). 
13 For a general discussion of the control function, see Note, The Control Powers of 
the Comptroller General, 56 CoLUM. L. REv. 1199 (1956). Because of the ability it gives 
to the Comptroller General to interfere with and disrupt executive programs, continual 
criticism has been made of the arrangement by which the power to control expenditures 
has been placed outside the executive branch. For sample criticisms, see 1\fANsFIELD, THE 
COMPTROLLER GENERAL 12, 274-88 (1939). This is the most comprehensive work on the 
subject of the General Accounting Office. See also, HooVER COMMISSION, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT OF FISCAL BUDGETING AND ACCOUNTING Acnv1TIES, Appendix F-10, 81-82 (1949). 
14 For a detailed discussion of the differences between the audit conducted by the 
Comptroller General and normal commercial audits, see The General Accounting Office, 
H.R. REP. No. 2264, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 119-20 (1956). 
15 42 Stat. 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 53 (1958). 
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The audit function of the Comptroller General is discharged 
by two very different procedures. The traditional, commercial 
check on accounts rendered by the executive departments and 
agencies and the evaluation of accounting systems may be regarded 
as the basic audit procedure. Such auditing, in addition to turn-
ing up errors in mathematics or accounting practice, may reveal 
extra-legal activities. But it is not calculated to reveal waste, ex-
travagance or inefficiency. The extraordinary duty of the Comp-
troller General to search for such practices is implemented by 
investigations which go beyond the ordinary problems of account-
ing and which are designed to probe into matters not disclosed by 
routine audit. It is obvious that such investigations may tum up 
illegal as well as uneconomical practices. 
Thus, by means of control, audit and investigation, the Comp-
troller General carries out his duty to uncover illegal executive 
expenditures. But it is by investigation alone that he discharges 
his extraordinary responsibility in the field of executive economy.16 
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 left open to dispute 
the question whether the Comptroller General, in carrying out the 
above-mentioned duties, acts in the name of and on behalf of the 
legislative or executive branch of the govemment.17 Were the 
Comptroller General to be considered as a part of the executive 
branch and thus subject to presidential order, it is obvious that 
the current disagreement over the scope of his authority could not 
have arisen. 
Ingenious arguments have been advanced in support of the 
proposition that the Comptroller General is a member of the 
16 Prior to 1957, the investigatory responsibilities of the General Accounting Office 
were divided between the Division of Audits and the Office of Investigations. The former, 
in addition to the routine audit of accounts, carried on extensive investigatory activities. 
The Office of Investigations conducted special investigations and surveys and developed 
information by the use of particular techniques. 
In line with suggestions made by the House Committee on Government Operations 
(supra note 14, at 7-8), the Accounting Systems Division, the Division of Audits and the 
Office of Investigation were merged to form two integrated offices which, in addition to 
other functions, are now responsible for investigations. These are the Defense Accounting 
and Auditing Division and the Civil Accounting and Auditing Division. See COMP. GEN. 
ANN. REP. (1956). 
17 Despite his quasi-judicial control function of interpreting legislation and mediating 
between Congress and the executive departments and agencies, the Comptroller General 
has never been considered an adjunct of the judiciary. But see the remark of Representa-
tive Good: "The general accounting office • • • will be to the appropriations made by 
Congress what the Supreme Court is to the construction of laws that are enacted by 
Congress." 59 CoNG. REc. 7949 (1920). 
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executive branch and must defer to presidential authority.18 The 
crux of these arguments is that the principle of the separation of 
powers prevents Congress from appointing an agent endowed with 
executive responsibilities which cannot be constitutionally ex-
ercised by any of its committees. On the other hand, it may be 
argued that the Comptroller General is a unique legislative as-
sistant to Congress in carrying out its responsibilities for the 
allocation of public funds.19 Congress has, in the Budget and 
Accounting Act of 1921 and in subsequent legislation, indicated 
its belief that the Comptroller General is independent of the 
executive branch,20 and the Comptroller General has consistently 
concurred in this view.21 
The question has never been authoritatively settled, and there 
is little purpose in discussing here the details of the debate.22 For 
purposes of this exposition, it will be assumed that in the per-
formance of his official duties the Comptroller General is a part 
of or acts on behalf of the Congress.23 
With this assumption in mind, it must then be asked whether 
the Comptroller General exercises the full power of Congress to 
monitor the execution by the executive branch of congressional 
appropriations, or only specific and limited powers delineated in 
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and subsequent legislation. 
If the former, then there would seem to be no limits to his au-
thority save those imposed generally on the Congress by the con-
stitutional separation of powers, and the executive branch could 
only challenge the Comptroller General's investigatory activities 
as it could those of a congressional committee. However, if the 
position is taken that the legislation sets forth more restricted 
authority, there exists a question of statutory interpretation con-
18 See, e.g., Langeluttig, The Legal Status of the Comptroller General of the United 
States, 23 ILL. L. REv. 556, 578-90 (1929). 
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 7. 
20 42 Stat. 23 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 41 (1958); and 64 Stat.. 834 (1950), 31 U.S.C. § 65 
(1958). 
21E.g., 14 Droi. CoMP. GEN. 648, 651 (1935), and testimony of Lindsay C. Warren, 
Comptroller General of the United States, Hearings Before Joint Committee on the 
Organization of Congress, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 532 (1945). 
22 See generally MANSFIELD, op. cit. supra note 13, at 74-92. 
23 At the present time, this seems to be a predominant viewpoint which follows from 
the fact that the evidence in favor of such a conclusion is most convincing. See WILLOUGH-
BY, LEGAL STATUS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT ch. 1 (1927), 
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cerning the scope of the investigatory power given the Comp-
troller General by the Congress. 
The General Accounting Office does not seem to occupy the 
place of a congressional committee, and, it is submitted, its in-
vestigatory powers vis-a-vis the executive branch may not properly 
be equated to those of a congressional committee. The executive 
functions of the General Accounting Office are such that no con-
gressional committee could be expected to duplicate them. Had 
it been anticipated that the General Accounting Office was simply 
to act like a committee, exercising the full congressional powers 
of inquiry, Congress need not have spelled out in detail its in-
vestigatory powers. The nature of the Budget and Accounting 
Act of 1921 indicates that the General Accounting Office was in-
tended to act on behalf of Congress according to a specific grant 
of authority specifying what part of the totality of the congressional 
power to investigate executive branch activity it is privileged to 
exercise. 
The Attorney General, in two opinions rendered shortly after 
the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, indicated 
his concurrence in this position. "The Comptroller General has 
such authority as is specifically given him by the Budget and Ac-
counting Act of 1921."24 "Notwithstanding the independent 
position of that office any order which extends beyond the au-
thority given it by Congress is void."25 
To determine the proper scope of this statutory investigatory 
power, attention must first be given to the actual development of 
the investigatory function and then to two fundamental questions: 
what is the statutory responsibility to be fulfilled by investigation, 
and how may the Comptroller General fulfill this responsibility? 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INVESTIGATORY FUNCTION OF THE 
COMPTROLLER GENERAL 
The duty and authority of the Comptroller General to in-
vestigate executive activities was initially defined in a single sec-
tion of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921: 
"The Comptroller General shall investigate, at the seat 
of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt, 
disbursement, and application of public funds, and shall make 
24 34 OPs. An'Y GEN. 311, 313 (1924). 
25 33 OPs. An'Y GEN. 383, 385 (1922). 
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to the President when requested by him, and to Congress at 
the beginning of each regular session, a report ... of the work 
of the General Accounting Office, containing recommenda-
tions concerning the legislation he may deem necessary .... 
[He] shall make recommendations looking to greater economy 
or efficiency in public expenditures."26 
In order to insure that these reports and recommendations 
would be uncompromising, and in furtherance of the Comptroller 
General's function announced by his sobriquet "the watchdog of 
Congress," the office was made relatively independent of the ex-
ecutive branch and given a broad power to require the cooperation 
of the executive departments and agencies in its programs. 
"All departments and establishments shall furnish to the 
Comptroller General such information regarding the powers, 
duties, activities, organization, financial transactions, and 
methods of business of their respective offices as he may from 
time to time require of them; and the Comptroller General 
... shall, for the purpose of securing such information, have 
access to and the right to examine any books, documents, 
pages, or records of any such department or establishment."27 
The legislative history of the Budget and Accounting Act of 
1921 does not readily afford accurate guidance to the meaning of 
these sections. A hurried reading of the sometimes theatrical 
denunciations of extravagance, waste and corruption placed on the 
record by crusading legislators suggests that investigation and re-
porting were to be given as much or more emphasis by the General 
Accounting Office as both control and audit.28 In explaining his 
conception of the main function of the Comptroller General, 
Chairman Good of the House Select Committee on the Budget 
said: 
26 42 Stat. 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 53 (1958). 
27 42 Stat. 26 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 54 (1958). It was the opinion of the Hoover Commis• 
sion that the control functions of the General Accounting Office made it impossible for 
the Comptroller General to carry out his investigatory duties in a proper fashion, for 
paving already by way of legislative interpretation intcrfcrrcd with the discharge by the 
President and the executive branch of their responsibility for the execution of the budget, 
the Comptroller General may be a party to action already taken rather than an independ-
ent critic. HooVER COMMISSION, supra note 13, at 81. Cf. !\fANsFIELD, op. cit. supra note 
13, at 13. 
28 The legislative history of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 shows a tendency 
on the part of congressmen to confuse the various functions of the Comptroller General. 
Thus, passing upon the legal phases of an expenditure, auditing and investigation arc all 
discussed in long, undifferentiated colloquies. 
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"It was the intention of the committee that the comptroller 
general should be something more than a book.keeper or ac-
countant; that he should be a real critic, and at all times 
should come to Congress ... and point out inefficiency, if he 
found that money was being misapplied ... which is another 
f • ffi • "29 term or me c1ency .... 
This was, however, quite obviously only one of the purposes 
for which the General Accounting Office was brought into ex-
istence, and in the early years of its operation the investigatory 
function was relegated to a very minor role. Neither by general 
nor special investigation did the General Accounting Office carry 
out what seems to have been an important purpose of the Act of 
1921. Writing in 1939, Mansfield reported that the Comptroller 
General was showing no interest in investigating and reporting to 
Congress improper or inefficient executive activities.30 Indeed, 
the Chief of Investigations testified in 1937, "We do very little 
real investigating."31 
Currently, the General Accounting Office is extensively in-
volved in investigatory activities which are part of what the Comp-
troller General refers to as modern techniques characterizing the 
work of the office.32 There has been a marked shift in administra-
tive emphasis from the concept of controlling expenditures 
through the authority to settle accounts to a new concept of audit-
ing executive departments and agencies by extended investigation 
and reporting to the Congress detailed criticisms of their financial 
administration. 33 
Auditing on a so-called "comprehensive" basis was instituted 
by the Comptroller General in 1949. According to the General 
Accounting Office, the purpose of the comprehensive audit is "to 
determine how well the agency or activity under audit has dis-
charged its :financial responsibilities .... "34 
"Although the term 'audit' is a general term normally 
applied to the process of examining accounting records and 
29 61 CONG. REC. 1090 (1921). 
30 "It seems at first blush a startling fact, nonetheless true, that the Comptroller 
General has not been responsible for uncovering a single one of the few conspicuous 
instances of financial knavery in the national government since 1921." MANSFIELD, op. cit. 
supra note 13, at 245. 
31 Testimony of S. B. Tulloss in Senate Hearings on Reorganization of the Government 
Agencies, Select Committee on Government Organization, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. at 316 (1937). 
32 COMP. GEN. ANN. REP. 2 (1958). 
33 H.R. REP., supra note 14, at 19. 
34Id. at 117. 
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documents, the term 'comprehensive audit' is not restricted to 
accounting matters or to books, records, and documents. . . . 
A comprehensive audit is an analytical and critical examina-
tion of an agency and its activities ... the scope of the com-
prehensive audit extends to all of an agency's operations and 
activities and to all of their aspects .... "815 
For his authority to carry out investigations having this ob-
jective, the Comptroller General relies basically on the sections 
of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 which have been 
quoted ~hove, and on certain subsequent legislation.36 The 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 194637 authorized and directed 
the Comptroller General to make expenditure analyses of each 
agency to "enable Congress to determine whether public funds 
have been economically and efficiently administered and ex-
pended." According to the Comptroller General, his authority 
and duty were "amplified" by this section.38 This conclusion is 
supported by the legislative history of the act. A Senate report 
recommended that: 
"[T]he scope of the work of the General Accounting 
Office be enlarged to include a service audit of the agencies of 
government. Such a service audit should include reports on 
the administrative performance and broad operation of the 
agency, together with information that will enable Congress 
to determine whether public funds are being carelessly, ex-
travagantly, or loosely administered and spent. In most cases 
the present detailed audit of items does not reveal the general 
. condition of the agency's operation."39 
The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 195040 carried 
out certain recommendations of the Hoover Commission.41 It 
directed that the Comptroller General in the performance of his 
duties give consideration to the "effectiveness of accounting or-
ganizations and systems, internal audit and control, and related 
administrative practices of the respective agencies." This act, ac-
cording to the Comptroller General, "clarified the existing audit 
811 Id. at 119. 
86Id. at ll8. 
87 60 Stat. 837 (1946), 31 U.S.C. § 60 (1958). 
88 Memoranda submitted by the General Accounting Office, see note 2 supra. And 
see id. Exhibits IV-C at 3761 and IV-D at 3764. 
80 S. REP. No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1946). 
-iO 64 Stat. 837 (1950), 31 U .S.C. § 67 (a) (1958). 
•U See S. REP. No. 2031, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1949). 
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authority."42 It seems apparent that Congress, dissatisfied with 
the extent to which the Comptroller General had previously ex-
ercised his investigatory power, was now encouraging an annual 
investigation along prescribed lines, the results of which were to 
be reported for its attention. It is the Comptroller General's in-
terpretation of this mandate and of his statutory authority which 
has brought him into conflict with the executive branch. 
Ill. STATUTORY PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATIONS MADE BY THE 
COMPTROLLER GENERAL 
The Comptroller General's duty to search for and bring to the 
attention of Congress instances of fraud and irregularity in the 
disbursement of public funds must be carefully distinguished from 
his duty to uncover waste or inefficiency in the executive branch. 
While the former purpose is sufficiently clear and requires no 
further discussion, the latter gives rise to difficult problems. Waste 
and inefficiency are readily distinguishable from illegality. They 
are not per se illegal and, indeed, may be a direct or indirect con-
sequence of executive action which carries out both the letter and 
the spirit of a congressional appropriation. Rather than a quest 
for instances of unauthorized activity, the search for waste and 
inefficiency is one involving value judgments concerning the means 
adopted by the executive branch to achieve the ends set forth by 
Congress in its appropriations. Questions have arisen with regard 
to the extent to which the Comptroller General has been au-
thorized to exercise his judgment and to conduct investigations in 
furtherance of this purpose. 
The Comptroller General was directed to investigate "all 
matters relating to the receipt, disbursement and application of 
public funds .... "43 The word "application" was introduced by 
Representative Luce44 with the intent to make clear the power of 
the Comptroller General to criticize expenditures made by the 
executive departments and agencies. Luce said that the Comp-
troller General should search for methods of economy in Govern-
ment; he should look for trouble and on his own initiative find 
ways to save money.45 Representative Madden was of the opinion 
that "the responsibility placed on the comptroller general under 
42 COMP. GEN. ANN. REP. 2 (1958). 
43 42 Stat. 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 53 (1958). 
44 58 CONG. REc. 7293 (1919); 61 CONG. REc. 1090 (1921). 
45 61 CONG. REc. 1090 (1921). 
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this law will enable him to ascertain the wisdom as well as the 
legality of the expenditures .... "46 However, this express duty to 
offer criticism is limited both by the separation of powers and by 
the underlying legislative intent of the Congress at the time of the 
enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. 
In our system of government the powers of the executive and 
legislative branches of government are both separate and inde-
pendent. Congress has the exclusive power to appropriate money, 
but its programs must be executed by the executive branch. Con-
versely, nearly every function of the executive branch involves 
financial support from Congress. Just as the executive branch 
may not authorize the disposition of public funds, Congress may 
not assume executive responsibilities by limiting executive discre-
tion or otherwise interfering with the exercise by the executive 
branch of its judgment in carrying out approved programs. To 
permit the Comptroller General to become directly involved in 
the operations by which an executive department or agency ex-
ercises its discretion is tantamount to permitting the Comptroller 
General, acting for the Congress, to interfere with the exercise of 
this discretion.47 There is no reason to believe that in endowing 
the office of the Comptroller General with the power to investigate 
for the purpose of offering criticism, Congress intended to disturb 
the existing separation of powers. Indeed, a contrary intent must 
be presumed. 
This presumption is buttressed by the legislative history of the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which seems to indicate that 
the Comptroller General was not considered a "super-executive" 
capable of interfering with the day-to-day function and discretion 
of the executive branch by becoming involved in the execution of 
appropriations. 
"Mr. Cooper of Wisconsin: Mr. Chairman, I would like to 
ask [Mr. Luce] just what the word 'application' means as dis-
tinguished from 'disbursement'? 
46 59 CoNG. REc. 7948 (1920). 
47 E.g., see Hearings Pursuant to Section 4, PL. 86-89, Special Subcommittee on Pro-
curement Practices of the Department of Defense of the Committee on Armed Services, 
House of Representatives, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 733 (1960), quoting the Report of the 
House Committee on Armed Services regarding H.R. 12299, " ••• [T]he committee regards 
as desirable the existence in the Comptroller General of a power to examine and question 
contracts so long as that power is exercised judiciously and with restraint, and does not 
lead to a substitution of the Comptroller General's judgment for the judgment of the 
agency head. The latter gives rise to the extremely unhealthy condition of in effect shared 
authority without shared responsibility. It also gives rise to delays and undesirable 
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"Mr. Good: The application of the disbursement, how the 
money was used .... 
"Mr. Cooper of Wisconsin: It does not mean that he him-
self can direct the application? He reports how it was applied? 
"Mr. Good: No, it does not mean that he can direct the 
application. He reports whether it was applied efficiently, 
whether it was wisely spent. He has no power to direct ex-
penditures.48 
"Representative Byrns: [T]he Comptroller General ... 
does not expend appropriations .... He audits the expendi-
tures - to see that appropriations made have been expended 
properly .... "49 
In reply to an expressed fear that the Comptroller General might 
become "bigger" than a cabinet member, Representative Madden 
said: "The comptroller auditor general has no power to take away 
the discretion of a cabinet officer as to what shall be done in the 
discharge of his duty ... ,"50 
Further expressions of congressional intent need not be mar-
shalled to indicate the basic lines of an often subtle distinction 
between criticisms of programs and policies developed by the 
executive branch in carrying out the will of Congress and criticism 
of specific, day-to-day administrative procedures utilized to imple-
ment these programs and policies. Decisions made by executive 
officers in the exercise of their discretion and pursuant to value 
judgments which they alone, by application of expertise, are 
capable of making, are not proper objects of the Comptroller 
General's scrutiny, and he may not conduct investigations the 
purpose of which is to criticize such decisions.51 The wisdom of 
uncertainties as to legal status. It is the considered view of the committee that where the 
agency acting in good faith makes a determination or decision reasonably supported in 
fact and law, such determination or decision should be final." 
48 61 CoNG. R.Ec. 1090 (1921). 
49 Id. at 1082. 
50 58 CoNG. R.Ec. 7277 (1919). 
51 At the present time the General Accounting Office is composed primarily of ac• 
counting personnel [As of June 30, 1958, the General Accounting Office had 5,389 em-
ployees. Of these, 2,294 were "accountants, auditors and investigators," 393, were Certified 
Public Accountants, 524 were engaged in legal work. COMP. GEN. ANN. REP. 5 (1958)], 
and it is not equipped to evaluate executive action taken on the basis of information 
developed and analyzed through the use of special expertise. Indeed, requests made by 
the General Accounting Office for access to internal departmental or agency studies, 
reports of the military inspector generals and the like would seem to indicate that the 
Office is often incapable of developing and evaluating similar information and must rely 
for both information and conclusions upon self-examinations which the executive branch 
may have conducted. The General Accounting Office contends that it seeks such informa• 
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discretionary policy decisions may, if at all, be called into question 
by Congress alone, and there is no evidence that Congress envis.-
aged the Comptroller General as its representative in the conduct 
of such an essentially political review. In the grey area between 
objective acts of administration which the Comptroller General 
may properly criticize and discretionary acts of policy-making 
which are beyond his authority, hard problems are sure to arise. 
"If the Comptroller General finds I 00 people doing the work 
of 50 in some department, this is his business."52 This statement 
illustrates the type of administrative conduct with which the 
Comptroller General is clearly concerned. Although he may in-
vestigate for the purpose of criticizing certain aspects of their 
implementation, the Comptroller General may not test for waste 
or inefficiency foreign policy and military strategy. He may criti-
cize the office management of the United States Treasury but not 
its monetary decisions. It may be legitimate for him to investigate 
the manner in which the Army decides who shall furnish its tanks 
or guns, but he may not become involved in the process by which 
the Army decides how many troops it needs to carry out its mission 
and what supplies are required for them. Similarly, the Comp-
troller General may interest himself in the calculation of post 
allowances paid to International Cooperation Administration rep-
resentatives overseas, but the overall development of economic 
assistance programs is a matter beyond the scope of his authority. 
Finally, the Comptroller General may not investigate for the pur-
pose of calling into question the sufficiency and appropriateness 
of information and documents which an executive may have relied 
upon in making a policy decision. He may not, in effect, sit in the 
chair of the executive and review information available to the 
executive for the purpose of testing whether, as a matter of econ-
omy, better decisions might have been made. 
In recent times, the General Accounting Office has used its 
investigatory powers to obtain information for the purpose of 
offering directly to the executive departments unsolicited remedial 
advice. There does not seem to be any legislative support for 
investigations having such a purpose. 
tion to avoid a duplication of work. Availability of Information from Federal Departments 
and Agencies, Report of the Committee on Government Operations of the House, H.R. 
REP. No. 234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1959). 
52 See 58 CONG. REc. 7293-94 (1919). 
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The Comptroller General is directed by the Budget and Ac-
counting Act of 1921 to: 
"make to the President when requested by him, and to Con-
gress at the beginning of each regular session, a report in 
writing . . . containing recommendations concerning the leg-
islation he may deem necessary to facilitate the prompt and 
accurate rendition and settlement of accounts and concerning 
such other matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and 
application of public funds as he may think advisable. In 
such regular report, or in special reports at any time when 
Congress is in session, he shall make recommendations looking 
to greater economy or efficiency in public expenditures."63 
Furthermore, he is required to make an expenditure analysis 
of each agency in the executive branch of the government and to 
report on such executive agencies to the Appropriations Commit-
tees and to the Legislative Committees of the two Houses having 
jurisdiction over legislation relating to the operations of the re-
spective agencies.64 
In addition to submitting these recommendations and reports 
to the Congress, the Comptroller General has been developing 
an informal procedure of offering advice directly to the executive 
departments and agencies on how they may improve their perform-
ance and eliminate what he deems to be waste and inefficiency. 
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 has been read by him to 
mean that he is "required to make recommendations looking to 
greater economy .... "66 
Even were such advice strictly limited to matters of objective 
administrative inefficiency which did not involve questions of 
managerial expertise and discretion, the tender of it is an unsanc-
tioned and troublesome addition to the functions of the General 
Accounting Office. Already criticized because the exercise of its 
control powers may hamper the executive departments, the Gen-
eral Accounting Office by this present device tends to exercise a 
new form of control far more potent than the first. Not only does 
lS3 42 Stat. 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 53 (1958). 
li4 60 Stat. 837 (1946), 31 U .S.C. § 60 (1958). 
!iii CoMP. GEN. ANN. REP. 1 (1958). "While General Accounting Office auditors are 
not empowered to direct changes in policies, procedures, and functions, they do observe 
opportunities for improving efficiency and for obtaining better results. When warranted, 
they will make recommendations for simplifying and developing more effective operating 
procedures .••. " H.R. REP. No. 2264, supra note 14, at 119. "Responsible officers ••• 
are advised of weaknesses, shortcomings, or irregularities, and proper corrective measures 
are suggested." H.R. REP. No. 1441, supra note 8, at 21. 
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the Comptroller General interpret appropriations, but in the name 
of economy he may recommend to the executive branch the way 
in which appropriations should be implemented. The penalty for 
disobedience is the same as that imposed for ignoring an interpre-
tation of legislation made by the Comptroller General - an accu-
sation before Congress and the injection of uncertainty into an 
executive program. While the interpretation of legislation by the 
Comptroller General is a formal act, the correctness of which may 
be contested, the advisory function is wholly informal and opinions 
cannot be appealed although for practical purposes they may have 
much the same force as do interpretations of legislation. 
IV. How MusT THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL EXERCISE His 
POWER OF INVESTIGATION? 
Not only is the Comptroller General subject to statutory limita-
tions on the purposes for which he may conduct investigations, 
but he is also subject to statutory restrictions on the manner in 
which he may discharge his proper duties. In this connection, two 
major questions must be answered: at what stage may executive 
branch activity be investigated by the Comptroller General, and 
to what extent may he require executive cooperation in his investi-
gatory activities? 
A. At What Stage May Executive Branch Activity Be Investigated 
by the Comptroller General? 
Current practices of the Comptroller General have made per-
tinent the question whether he may investigate executive action 
merely proposed or in the planning stage as well as final executive 
decisions and implemented programs. For the purpose of furnish-
ing advice to management, or for the purpose of reporting in 
advance to Congress any unimplemented executive plans deemed 
by him to harbor the seeds of waste or inefficiency, or for the pur-
pose of exerting informal pressure on the executive departments 
and agencies to conduct their affairs in compliance with the rec-
ommendations of the General Accounting Office, the Comptroller 
General has sought to move forward the time of certain investiga-
tions to precede the fait accompli of an executive policy imple-
mented, a final decision made, or a final position taken. This has 
involved requests by the Comptroller General for information 
relating to the internal deliberations of officials of the executive 
branch often at the same time as such deliberations are in progress. 
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Although there has been substantial debate concerning the 
question whether Congress has the constitutional power to compel 
the executive to disclose information concerning its internal, pre-
liminary operations, this question is not reached here, for a review 
of the legislative history of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 
leads to the conclusion that Congress did not intend that the Comp-
troller General should commence the performance of his investiga-
tory duties until final executive decisions had been made or final 
executive actions had been taken. There is nothing in all of the 
congressional debates stretching over several years to indicate that 
the Comptroller General was expected to interest himself in execu-
tive activities which have not reached a state of finality and which 
are evidenced only by internal reports and recommendations made 
by subordinate employees of the executive departments to their 
superiors and by the internal deliberations of executive officials 
leading up to and preceding final decisions. With regard to inves-
tigations for illegal conduct such a limitation is, of course, inescapa-
ble. Furthermore, investigations are a part of the general audit 
responsibility of the Comptroller General. Although they may be 
conducted for purposes other than those traditionally attributed 
to auditing and by procedures going beyond the simple check of 
accounts, none of the legislation on which the Comptroller Gen-
eral relies suggests that investigations may be conducted at times 
having no relationship to audit. The audit of expenditures on be-
half of Congress, whatever its scope, was to take place, as an audit 
must, after executive action has been taken. The practice of "pre-
audit" - a review of accounts and vouchers preceding the final 
act of disbursement from the Treasury - does not interfere with 
this concept.56 
Said Representative Parrish: 
"[T]he accounting department ... will audit ... all the ex-
penditures after the money has been appropriated by Con-
gress, and while in its nature it will be a post-mortem 
examination, yet I feel that it will have a beneficial effect. 
There will be made by the comptroller general a careful audit 
of all expenditures in the Government, and the effect will be 
to advise Congress and the people whether or not those en-
trusted with the expenditures of public money have carried 
out the wishes of Congress."57 
56 "The audits conducted by the General Accounting Office are for the most part 
after the fact, or post audits ...• " H.R. REP. No. 1441, supra note 8, at 12. 
57 58 CoNG. REc. 7204 (1919). 
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He was echoed by Representative Madden who indicated that 
"the audit is made after the expenditure, not before,"58 and by 
Representative Byrns who said, "he acts as the auditor for Con-
gress, to see that the appropriations made have been expended 
properly."59 
There is no indication that the congressional authors of the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 gave consideration to the pos-
sibility that the Comptroller General might pass judgment upon 
the wisdom of contemplated executive action or that the executive 
departments and agencies would have to clear each and every plan 
with the General Accounting Office before taking a final position 
or implementing a program. In view of the fear expressed by 
certain congressmen that the Comptroller General might interfere 
with executive discretion and the assurances given in this respect, 
it seems certain that if there had been presented any understanding 
that the Comptroller General was being empowered to anticipate 
executive inefficiency and to give advance clearance to executive 
projects the debates would have been far different. Subsequent 
legislation has not affected this situation, for none of the provisions 
of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 or of the Budget and 
Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 sanction advance investigation. 
The duties imposed upon the Comptroller General by these acts 
may be carried out fully without reference to information of a 
preliminary nature. 60 
Moreover, the hypothesis that the Comptroller General was to 
limit his search for waste and inefficiency to projects accomplished 
or in progress is further substantiated by the fact that he has not 
been given authority to prevent the execution by an executive 
department or agency of proposed projects deemed uneconomical. 
When illegal activity is uncovered, the Comptroller General may 
exercise his jurisdiction to settle and adjust public accounts and 
command acquiescence in his determinations of the meaning of 
fiscal legislation by disallowing payments. There is no sanction 
for instances of potential waste except for congressional action to 
58 Id. at 7278. (Emphasis added.) 
50 61 CONG. REc. 1082 (1921). (Emphasis added.) 
oo Assuming that the Comptroller General may evaluate the efficiency of the admin-
istrative procedures by which plans for the expenditure of appropriations are developed 
(the decision-making process), such evaluation may be based on the planning history of 
completed executive programs. It seems wholly unwarranted for the Comptroller General, 
in investigating the decision-making process, to require the revelation of recommendations 
and staff papers relating to proposed action only and which have not figured and may 
never figure in actual programs. 
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prevent the continuation or repetition by the executive branch of 
particular procedures it believes uneconomical, and there is little 
if any precedent for congressional interference in executive pro-
grams neither finalized nor implemented. Although to avoid the 
inconvenience of disallowance, the executive departments often 
seek and receive advance rulings from the Comptroller General 
regarding the legality of a given disbursement, this does not mean 
that he has the authority, on his own motion and over protest, to 
investigate incomplete executive action. 
There is no doubt that, although without formal sanction, 
advance determinations made by the Comptroller General of the 
,;\Tisdom from the point of view of economy of programs contem-
plated by the executive branch exert a strong pressure in the direc-
tion of compliance. The executive departments and agencies, of 
course, are free to ignore the position taken by the Comptroller 
General and to answer only to Congress. Nevertheless, they are 
informally constrained to agree with the Comptroller General on 
questions open to dispute. By the very fact of investigation, the 
Comptroller General exerts a type of control; just as the power to 
interpret legislation has, even without reference to existing sanc-
tions, enabled him to coerce the executive branch, so the practice 
of advance investigation for waste and inefficiency permits him, as 
a super-executive, to interfere with executive branch discretion 
and judgment. 
The compelling standards of executive conduct are fixed in-
formally rather than by judicially-enforced rights and duties. Ad-
ministrative officers have not the time or energy for controversy 
with the General Accounting Office. No public officer wants to be 
put on the defensive concerning his financial record. The case 
against him may be baseless, but in the public eye it is a prima fade 
case.61 Accusatory reports of the Comptroller General are pub-
lished and normally receive wide press coverage. The reply of the 
accused department or agency may be interred with the reputation 
of its administrators. The mere power of publicity and the threat 
that a particular course of action, if taken, could involve the exec-
utive in a lengthy defense before Congress, enable the Comptroller 
General to exert influence on every sort of executive action within 
the purview of his investigation. 
Faced with these twin possibilities, executive departments and 
agencies in the process of formulating plans are likely to avoid the 
61See MANSFIELD, op. cit. supra note 13, at 117. 
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fray with its attendant uncertainty and accept the suggestions of 
the Comptroller General. Thus a power to report uneconomical 
practices to Congress is being turned by the Comptroller Gen-
eral into a power to influence the course of executive decisions 
without reference to the Congress. There is every reason to doubt 
that the Congress, zealous to protect the money it appropriates, 
intended to establish in each executive department and agency a 
prosecutor-in-residence whose job it is to evaluate every executive 
project proposed or planned and to give an advance opinion 
whether the project, carried out, will give rise to a complaint and 
prosecution before the Congress on grounds of waste and ineffi-
ciency. Indeed, a former Comptroller General has himself testified 
against such a procedure. Testifying in 1945, Lindsay C. Warren 
said, "It is not our function to go to an agency and sit in it and see 
how things are going on. That would be an intolerable situation 
both for the agencies and for us."62 
If the Comptroller General is permitted to investigate and criti-
cize executive projects at stages preceding :finality, he will soon in 
the name of economy exercise a de facto control over the executive 
function which Congress did not and, because of the separation 
of powers, could not, constitutionally have authorized. 
B. What Executive Cooperation May Be Compelled 
by the Comptroller General'! 
A second major question concerning the way in which the 
Comptroller General may discharge his statutory duty to investi-
gate involves the extent to which he may compel executive coop-
eration in furtherance of announced programs of investigation. 
We are concerned here with the scope of the congressional order 
that information and documents be made available to the Comp-
troller General by the executive branch. This is the most practical 
matter to be discussed, for it involves the process by which the 
Comptroller General comes into direct contact with the executive 
departments and agencies. 
In support of the contention that he is entitled to unrestricted 
access to the books, documents and records of the executive 
branch, 63 the Comptroller General has chosen to read literally the 
language of certain statutes. He relies essentially on section 313 
62 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 79th Cong., 
1st Sess. 543 (1945). 
68 See text at note 2 supra. 
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of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.64 He claims, however, 
that his power to compel cooperation is bolstered and confirmed 
by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,65 by the Govern-
ment Corporation Control Act directing him to give consideration 
to administrative reports and controls of the agencies supervising 
government corporations, 66 and by the Budget and Accounting 
Procedures Act of 1950.67 
Even if it were constitutionally able to do so, there is no reason, 
however, to believe that Congress has in fact granted to the Comp-
troller General an anomalous, unlimited power to secure any 
information or to inspect any executive papers and records for any 
purpose which he may in his nonreviewable discretion deem ap-
propriate. If the limitations on the purposes for which the Comp-
troller General may conduct investigations and the time at which 
he may conduct them are to have any meaning, they must be en-
forced by a reciprocal limitation on the authority of the Comp-
troller General to require executive cooperation. 
The basic provision of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 
on which the Comptroller General relies was enacted to assist him 
in the performance of his statutory duties. Despite its compre-
hensive language, it must be read in the context of the entire act 
and taken to have meaning only in relation to the specific purposes 
for which the Office of the Comptroller General was created. 
Attempts made by the Comptroller General to exercise the access 
rights vested in him by the act for purposes unrelated to his statu-
tory duty must be regarded as wholly unauthorized and his de-
mands may be rejected by the executive departments on statutory 
grounds.68 
Each request by the Comptroller General that executive infor-
mation or documents be made available for his scrutiny must be 
judged by whether or not the material requested is relevant to an 
investigation undertaken by the Comptroller General for such 
purposes and at such times as are consistent with the proper dis-
charge of his statutory responsibility. The extent of the statutory 
authority of the Comptroller General to investigate executive ac-
tion has already been explored; from this it follows that the Comp-
troller General may not: 
64 42 Stat. 26 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 54 (1958). 
65 60 Stat. 837 (1946), 31 U.S.C. § 60 (1958). 
66 59 Stat. 601 (1945), 31 U.S.C. § 866 (a) (1958). 
67 64 Stat. 837 (1950), 31 U .S.C. § 67 (a) (1958). 
68 This reasoning does not seem to be affected by the amendment to the Mutual Security 
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I. While conducting a proper investigation require access 
to information and documents which are clearly irrelevant. 
2. Require information for the purpose of criticizing 
executive programs and policies which by their nature must 
be absolutely discretionary and the wisdom of which may, if 
at all, be debated by Congress alone. In this connection, he 
may not require access at any time to reports, opinions or rec-
ommendations which have been the basis of policy planning 
and the exercise by the executive branch of its judgment de-
spite the fact that they may incidentally contain information 
bearing on the objective administrative aspects of a program 
with which the General Accounting Office is legitimately 
concerned. 
3. Require, in the course of investigating an appropriate 
activity, information then being considered by executive offi-
cials in connection with final decisions to be made or action to 
be taken at a future time. 
V. ENFORCEMENT OF THE STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON 
THE INVESTIGATORY POWERS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL 
If any future executive branch challenges to the investigatory 
Appropriations Act of 1960 designed to facilitate access to information belonging to the 
International Cooperation Administration. Section Ill (d) of this act (P.L. 86-383) states: 
"None of the funds herein appropriated shall be used to carry out any provision of 
chapter II, III, or IV of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, in any country, 
or with respect to any project or activity, after the expiration of the thirty-five day 
period which begins on the date the General Accounting Office or any committee of the 
Congress, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, charged with considering legis-
lation or appropriations for, or expenditures of, the International Cooperation Admin-
istration, has delivered to the office of the Director of the International Cooperation 
Administration a written request that it be furnished any document, paper, communica-
tion, audit, review, finding, recommendation, report, or other material relating to the 
administration ••• in such country or with respect to such project or activity, unless and 
until there has been furnished to the General Accounting Office, or to such committee 
or subcommittee, as the case may be, (1) the document, paper, communication, audit, 
review, finding, recommendation, report, or other material so requested, or (2) a certifica-
tion by the President that he has forbidden its being furnished pursuant to such request, 
and his reason for so doing." 
It is clear that Congress in enacting this section did not seek to increase the basic 
investigatory powers of the Comptroller General vis-a-vis the International Cooperation 
Administration. The language of this section merely recapitulates the provision of the 
Budget and Accounting Act relating to information and provides a sanction to the failure 
by the International Cooperation Administration, without presidential support, to provide 
such information. Indeed, upon signing H.R. 7500 on July 24, 1959, President Eisen-
hower issued the following statement: 
"I have signed this bill on the express premise that the three amendments relating 
to disclosure are not intended to alter and cannot alter the recognized Constitutional 
duty and power of the Executive with respect to the disclosure of information, documents, 
and other materials. Indeed, any other construction of these amendments would raise 
grave Constitutional questions under the historic Separation of Powers Doctrine." White 
House Press Release, July 24, 1959. 
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powers of the Comptroller General were to be based on an alleged 
absence of statutory authority, there would arise a difference be-
tween two branches of the federal government appropriate for 
judicial resolution. How may such resolution be obtained? 
It is the contention of the Comptroller General that he may 
determine for himself what investigations are proper and what in-
formation he may require from the executive branch to carry them 
out. In the absence of any judicial decisions construing the 
statutes granting him access to information, he relies for support 
in this analysis of his authority to co!Ilpel cooperation on an 
opinion of the Attorney General rendered in 192560 and claims 
that this opinion should be controlling within the executive 
branch. 
In a letter dated January 2, 1925, the Secretary of War indicated 
to the Attorney General that pursuant to a policy regarding gov-
ernment procurement contracts the Comptroller General had 
called upon the Quartermaster General of the Army to supply in-
formation relative to the awarding of contracts to the "lowest 
responsible bidder." The Comptroller General had required that 
contracts submitted for routine audit be accompanied by a show-
ing that the lowest bid had been accepted or a detailed statement of 
the reason for accepting a different bid. It was the position of the 
Secretary of War that the statutes then governing the purchase of 
supplies and the engagement of services reposed powers of judg-
ment and discretion in the contracting officer and the Comptroller 
General could not review the exercise of such judgment and discre-
tion. In his reply of March 21, 1925,70 the Attorney General said, 
"It will be observed that the Comptroller General states that this 
requirement is made necessary in order that a satisfactory audit 
may be made. What papers or data he should have to make such 
an audit would seem to be a matter solely for his determination." 
It may be perceived that the topic of discussion was the routine 
audit of contracts for the purpose of determining whether the ex-
ecutive agency involved had proceeded according to law. The 
opinion of the Attorney General relates to the audit and control 
functions of the Comptroller General rather than to his investigat-
ing and reporting activities currently under consideration. It 
states simply that when engaged in the legitimate audit of con-
tracts for the purpose of determining their compliance with law, 
60 Memoranda, supra note 2, at Exhibit IV-A, pp. 3777-78. 
70 34 Ops, An'y GEN. 446-47 (1925). 
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the Comptroller General may rely on section 313 of the Budget 
and Accounting Act of 1921 to require any papers or data he deems 
necessary. The opinion does not apply to or affect the Comp-
troller General's very different power of investigation for waste 
and inefficiency. Although the Comptroller General relies upon 
section 313 to secure executive cooperation in both audits and 
investigations, these functions are not identical. If the Attorney 
General has said that in the pro forma business of auditing con-
tracts or accounts the Comptroller General may determine for 
himself what information he requires, this does not supply a 
precedent for the proposition that in carrying out the far less 
routine duty of investigating and reporting the Comptroller Gen-
eral may equally decide at will what he will have from the executive 
branch. Moreover, no question of the legitimacy of the audit had 
been raised. It cannot, therefore, be said that the opinion of the 
Attorney General means that the Comptroller General may deter-
mine for himself what information he needs in connection with an 
investigation alleged to be beyond his statutory authority. 
The Attorney General has, in fact, had a good deal to say about 
the authority of the Comptrollen General and h'as rendered 
opinions challenging both the right of the Comptroller General 
to become involved in certain executive activities and his au-
thority to require executive cooperation.71 The question of the 
reviewability by the Attorney General of demands for informa-
tion made by the Comptroller General has arisen mainly in con-
nection 1vith the Comptroller General's exercise of his control 
powers-his activity as an interpreter of legislation rather than an 
enforcer of economy.72 
The Comptroller General has contended that he has the right 
to decide questions of law regarding the proper use of funds and to 
determine the proper scope of his authority in this field.73 How-
ever, the Attorney General has not agreed that the Comptroller 
General may supersede him as legal adviser to the executive de-
partments or that the Comptroller General may decide finally 
how much discretion lies with the executive departments them-
selves in determining the import of legislation.74 There does not 
71 See, e.g., 34 OPs, An'Y GEN. !Ill (1924). 
72 See generally MANSFIELD, op. cit. supra note 13, at 93-116. 
73 E.g., 14 DEC!. COMP. GEN. 648 (1935), disclaiming the authority of courts other 
than the Supreme Court and of the Attorney General to review decisions of the Comp-
troller General as to the legal availability of a particular appropriation for a use as made. 
74 34 OPs. An'Y GEN. 162 (1924). 
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seem to be any instance in which the Attorney General has chal-
lenged an exercise by the Comptroller General of his investigatory 
power - as opposed to audit or control - on the ground that juris-
diction was lacking. Nevertheless, the executive branch might 
resort to the self-proclaimed authority of the Attorney General to 
interpret for them the powers of the Comptroller General76 and, 
relying upon such interpretations, refuse to yield to the Comp-
troller General's allegedly improper demands for information. 
Although there is no precedent for judicial review of the in-
vestigatory powers of the Comptroller General, the matter does 
not seem wholly beyond the purview of the courts, for the author-
ity of the Comptroller General is, by his own admission, statutory, 
and a certain violence would be done the principle of the separa-
tion of powers were it to be settled that the Comptroller General 
alone may construe the statutes on which he relies.76 Such a con-
clusion may also be regarded as ironic in view of the purpose 
sought to be achieved by the creation of the Office of the Comp-
troller General. It was the position of Congress, reiterated through-
out the legislative history of the Budget and Accounting Act of 
1921, that for reasons which are self-evident the executive branch 
should not be allowed to execute congressional appropriations and 
at the same time have the responsibility for interpreting these ap-
propriations and for auditing its mvn expendtures. Yet the very in-
strumentality created to check the evil which comes of permitting 
the actor to judge his own acts now argues that it has precisely the 
power Congress thought too dangerous for the executive branch. 
75 33 OPS. Arr'Y GEN. 383 (1922), and see Letter from the Attorney General to the 
President, Dec. 22, 1960, in White House Press Release, Dec. 23, 1960. Interpretations of law 
rendered by the Attorney General are advisory rather than decisive. 9 OPS. Arr'Y GEN. 
36 (1857). The Comptroller General does not, therefore, regard himself as affected in 
any way by such opinions. 14 DECS. COMP. GEN. 648-49 (1935). 
76 The problem of determining the relevancy of requests by the Comptroller General 
for information was inconclusively discussed on March 10, 1958 before the Subcommittee 
of the House Armed Services Committee [Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee No. 
6, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1958)]. 
"Mr. Dechert: The question of relevancy, I hope, would never arise. If it did arise, 
it would be a matter of joint determination. 
"Mr. Courtney: Is the matter of relevancy, in your opinion, and as you conduct your 
office now, a matter to be determined within the Department of Defense? 
"Mr. Dechert: I think this issue hasn't arisen, Mr. Courtney, and therefore I think I 
cannot answer it ...• As I understand it, the question is, Suppose that an issue arose 
between the General Accounting Office and the Department of Defense as to whether a 
particular paper was or was not relevant? 
"I think if the Department of Defense, after a joint consultation, felt that its view 
was correct, the only thing it could do would be to refer it to the President." 
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How, then, may the question of the Comptroller General's 
lack of authority to investigate be brought before a court? Judicial 
review of decisions of the Comptroller General made in the exer-
cise of his control powers may be invoked by a suit to recover a 
disallowed payment, by a suit in the Court of Claims to compel a 
payment withheld at the behest of the Comptroller General, or by 
an action in mandamus to compel payment.77 Presumably, the 
question of the investigatory power of the Comptroller General 
might be raised in a similar fashion upon the cutting off of Inter-
national Cooperation Administration funds, for example, as a 
result of a failure by that agency to comply with a General Ac-
counting Office request for information.78 
It is possible that a particular refusal to comply with a request 
made by the Comptroller General for information could be 
brought to the attention of Congress which might then pass a 
resolution directing the Speaker to issue a warrant directing the 
Sergeant-at-Arms to take the reluctant executive officer into custody 
and bring him before Congress.79 Upon further refusal to supply 
the information, the Congress could order him to be locked in the 
Guard Room of the Capitol Police.80 A petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus would bring the matter before the courts.81 There 
is some precedent for such contempt proceedings, but this means 
of achieving judicial vindication of the position of the executive 
branch vis-a-vis the General Accounting Office is, of course, im-
practical.82 Pursuant to section 194 of title 2, U.S.C., a refusal 
to cooperate might be reported to the "district attorney for the 
District of Columbia" for prosecution.83 However, the unwilling-
77 It is the position of the Comptroller General that he must decide for himself 
whether the decision of any court other than the Supreme Court will serve as a precedent 
and a guide for his future behavior. 14 DEcs. COMP. GEN. 648, 652 (1935). 
78 See note 68 supra. Although the Comptroller General has sought to cut off certain 
funds, the President has ordered the executive branch to continue payments on the ground 
that the position of the Comptroller General is based on an "erroneous interpretation of 
law which would reach an unconstitutional result." Letter from the President to the 
Secretary Concerning the Office of Inspector General and Comptroller, Mutual Security, 
Dec. 23, 1960, Department of State Press Release No. 706, Dec. 23, 1960. 
79 See S. REs. 15, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. REc. 163 (1953) providing for custody 
of persons. This resolution was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration. 
80 See 3 HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE §§ 1669, 1672, 1684, 1686, 1690 (1935). 
81 The President may, in any event, have power to pardon him. See Ex parte Gross-
man, 267 U.S. 87 (1925). 
82See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); Stewart v. Blaine, I MacArthur 
(8 D.C.) 453 (1874). 
8311 Stat. 155 (1857), 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1958). 
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ness of the Attorney General to prosecute and the power of the 
President to pardon in advance84 would obviate any such 
proceeding. 
In the absence of an easy method for securing a judicial reso-
lution of the current differences between the executive branch 
and the Comptroller General, only Congress itself, through clarify-
ing legislation, may finally decide what investigatory powers with-
in constitutional limits it wishes the Comptroller General to exer-
cise. Until such time as additional legislation may be enacted, the 
foregoing analysis of the statutory powers of investigation of the 
Comptroller General indicates that the executive branch may suc-
cessfully challenge his investigations on the basis of statutory as 
well as constitutional limitations on their scope. 
84 See TAFr, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS 121-24 (1925). 
